

Pages 1 through 2 redacted for the following reasons:

-----Page (1)-(2): - CCN: 02SEP15-MEDJ-0199-4XNA/C, Referred to Office of Inspector General, US Department of Defense Criminal Investigative Service European Post of Duty for review/return

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (CLOSED ONLY)

07SEP15

SPECIAL INQUIRY (II)

CONTROL: 04SEP15-MEDJ-0203-4XNA/C

I/CAMP LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI/ALLEGATION OF WASTE ABOARD CAMP LEMONNIER

COMMAND/CAMP LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI/3379A

MADE AT/MEDJ/DJIBOUTI - NCISRU/ (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT

EXHIBIT(S)

- (1) IA: RESULTS OF RECEIPT OF COMPLAINT FROM KBR/05SEP15
- (2) IA: RESULTS OF COORDINATION WITH PUBLIC WORKS AND REVIEW OF TASK ORDER/05SEP15

NARRATIVE

1. This reactive investigation was initiated after NCISRA Djibouti received a complaint of potential waste of U.S. Government property aboard Camp Lemonnier (CLDJ). This was a joint investigation with the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) Djibouti, Information Report #2015002431-80DJ-P5/X.

2. On 31Aug15, Reporting Agent (RA) and Participating Agent (PA) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) spoke with (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) an employee of Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Incorporated (KBR), who stated that approximately 35,000 Meals, Ready-to-Eat (MREs), each containing a flameless ration heater (FRH), were to be disposed of. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated KBR received a task order from the Public Works Division, CLDJ, to dispose of the MREs. The disposal process called for the removal of all the FRHs from the individual MREs, which were activated by submersing each FRH in water in order to make the item unusable and safe. After the MREs were rendered safe, the items were loaded onto dump trucks and hauled to a local landfill in Douda, Djibouti. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) believed it was a waste of taxpayer dollars to have approximately 35,000 unopened and expired MREs being stored at CLDJ, and to simply dispose of thousands of the items. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said the MREs came from three different entities on the base: (1) CLDJ; (2) Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), a tenant command housed aboard CLDJ; and (3) Task Force 48, a tenant command housed aboard CLDJ. A review of the packing labels and documents located on the outside of each box containing the MREs revealed each box contained 12 MREs and a FRH for each. The documents also denoted two manufacturing dates for the MREs: 05Jun93 and 22Aug94. The MREs expired in 2014. Exhibit (1) pertains.

3. On 01Sep15, RA and PA (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) met with (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Contracting Officer (KO), Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC), Europe, Africa, Southwest Asia (EURAFSWA), Public Works Division-Acquisition, CLDJ, regarding the disposal of the MREs. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said the Public Works Division awarded a task order in the amount of \$3,814.20 to KBR for the disposal of expired MREs. This task order was to be performed under the Base Operating Service Contract (BOSC) portion of Contract No. N62470-13-D-3008, a firm

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CONTROL: 04SEP15-MEDJ-0203-4XNA/C

07SEP15

fixed prices (FFP) contract. (b)(6), (b)(7)(S) stated that several months ago CLDJ, CJTF-HOA and Task Force 48, discovered expired MREs within their respective storage areas and in order to increase storage space, CLDJ and the two tenant commands decided to pool together their funding sources in an effort to dispose of the MREs. The cost was split between CLDJ, CJTF-HOA, and Task Force 48. The expired MREs from CLDJ and the two tenant commands were gathered from their respective storage areas, combined, and the above referenced task order was processed in order to dispose of the items. The Agents reviewed the task order provided and revealed that KBR was tasked with the disposal of 2,977 expired cases of MREs with FRHs; the total number of MREs and FRHs was 35,724. Per the task order, KBR had 14 calendar days to complete the activity. Exhibit (2) pertains.

4. Based on information obtained during the inquiry, no further action will be taken by DCIS or NCISRA Djibouti. Investigation closed.

PARTICIPANTS

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SA, DCIS Djibouti

DISTRIBUTION

NCISHQ:23A1

INFO :MEDJ/MEFO/002A

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PAGE 2 LAST (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) LNN

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (CLOSED ONLY)

17SEP13

COMMUNICATION OF A THREAT (II)

CONTROL: 11SEP13-MEDJ-0100-7CNA/C

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

COMMAND/CAMP LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI/3379A

MADE AT/MEDJ/DJIBOUTI - NCISRU (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT

EXHIBIT(S)

- (1) IA: Results of Interview With CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) 11Sep13
- (2) Sworn Statement of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) 11Sep13
- (3) IA: RESULTS OF PERMISSIVE SEARCH OF (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) LIVING QUARTERS/11Sep13
- (4) IA: Results of Contact with Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) 13Sep13
- (5) IA: Results of Electronic Service Record Book Review of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NARRATIVE

1. This reactive investigation was initiated to document the suspected violation of Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), communication of a threat.
2. This investigation was initiated on 11Sep13 subsequent to a report from LT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) Camp Lemonnier Djibouti (CLDJ), that he received information concerning (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) making threats to harm himself and possibly other people on base. LT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also advised ammunition was recovered from (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) containerized living unit (CLU) and he was in possession of a knife. According to LT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) reported to the base Emergency Medical Force (EMF) base psychologist CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USN, who spoke with (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and conducted a mental assessment.
3. On 11Sep13, Reporting Agent (RA) conducted an interview with CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USN, CLDJ Emergency Medical Facility (EMF) Psychologist regarding her interaction with (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised she first spoke with (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) on 10Sep13 at approximately 1100 hours. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised he was dealing with a lot of personal issues and felt himself "getting out of control" and he wanted to get help. CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised she did not have any information regarding (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) medical treatment and prescription history. CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised she did not perceive (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) to be a threat to himself or anyone else; however, she believed he did need to redeploy back to his home command and seek additional mental health counseling and assistance. CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) further advised (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) did not make any direct threats to hurt himself or others. Exhibit (1) contains amplifying details.
4. On 11Sep13, RA and Special Agent (SA) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) conducted an interrogation of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Prior to the interrogation (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was advised of his Article 31B Rights via the NCIS Military Suspect's Acknowledgement and

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CONTROL:11SEP13-MEDJ-0100-7CNA/C

17SEP13

Waiver of Rights form. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) acknowledged and subsequently waived his rights. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised he was dealing with a lot of personal issues, to include the death of his biological father, his grandfather's terminal illness and a break up with his long-term girlfriend. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised he did not have any issues with anyone in his command or on base, nor did he have any intention of physically hurting himself or anyone else. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised his current Deployment Medical Readiness was listed as amber due to previous incidents involving physical altercations with other soldiers. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised due to his current amber level rating he was not cleared to deploy to Djibouti, because he is deemed a "high risk". However, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was cleared for deployment with an amber rating once he agreed and subsequently stopped taking his prescribed psychotropic prescriptions to include Prozac. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised he has a history of "acting out" physically to include getting in fist fights and taking numerous prescription medications with alcohol.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) further advised he has never attempted or had suicidal or homicidal ideations. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised he never made any threats of any kind to harm himself or others. He was aware of his deteriorating mental state and wanted to seek help prior to him reaching a breaking point. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) provided a sworn statement which is included as Exhibit (2).

5. On 11Sep13, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) provided a Permissive Authorization for Search and Seizure (PASS) of his CLU. SA's (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) conducted a search of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) CLU. No items of evidentiary value were located or seized. Exhibit (3) contains amplifying details.

6. On 11Sep13, NCIS Threat Mitigation Unit SA (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was contacted and provided feedback based on the information provided. There are concerns regarding (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) frame of mind and potential for violence. SA (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) provided RA with additional follow up questions to ask (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) which were addressed and noted in his statement. SA (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) recommends and supports CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) request to re-deploy (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) back to his home command.

7. On 13Sep13, RA met with EMF Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USN. Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) provided RA with the knife and ammunition seized from (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). The items were logged into NCISRU Djibouti evidence vault under long number MEDJ-022-13. Exhibit (4) contains amplifying details.

8. On 13Sep13, Reporting Agent (RA) conducted an electronic Service Record Book (SRB) review regarding (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Personal information previously reported in this investigation on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) were confirmed as accurate. No other relevant or derogatory information was revealed. Exhibit (5) contains amplifying details.

9. On 11Sep13, Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) - Horn of Africa (HOA), Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), LTC (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USA, and Army 1/63 Combined Arms Battalion (CAB) Commander, LTC (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USA, were apprised of the status of this investigation. LTC (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was re-deployed to his home command on 13Sep13.

10. Criminal history checks for (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) utilizing National Crime Information Center, the Defense Clearance Investigation Index and Consolidated Law Enforcement Operations Center were met with negative results.

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CONTROL:11SEP13-MEDJ-0100-7CNA/C

17SEP13

11. Due to the lack of legitimate/specific threat communicated in addition to (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) redeployment, this case was referred to command for appropriate intervention. This investigation is closed.

PARTICIPANTS

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT, MEDJ
SPECIAL AGENT, NCISHQ 0023 (TMU)

DISTRIBUTION

NCISHQ:0023

INFO :MEDJ/1/63 Combined Arms Battalion (LTC (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
USA) (H)/014C/MEFO

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (CLOSED ONLY)

29MAY13

COMMUNICATION OF A THREAT (II)

CONTROL: 24MAY13-MEDJ-0058-7CNA/C

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

COMMAND/CAMP LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI/3379A

MADE AT/MEDJ/DJIBOUTI - NCISRU (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT

EXHIBIT(S)

- (1) Sworn Statement of AC2 (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USN/24MAY13
- (2) Sworn Statement of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) CIV/24MAY13
- (3) IA: RECEIPT OF TRANSLATED STATEMENT OF WARSAMA, DJIBOUTIAN
LOCAL NATIONAL/29MAY13
- (4) IA: RECEIPT OF PHOTOGRAPH OF METAL PIPE/29MAY13

NARRATIVE

1. This reactive investigation was initiated under suspected violation of Article 339 (Threats Against a Person) of the Djiboutian Penal Code.

2. On 24MAY13, the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), LT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USN for Camp Lemonnier Djibouti (CLDJ) notified the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) that AC2 (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was threatened by a Djiboutian named (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) NFI, on 24MAY13 at approximately 0025, in the Air Traffic Control Tower at the Djibouti Ambouli International Airport (DAIA).

3. On 24MAY13, Reporting Agent (RA) and Participating Agent (PA) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) interviewed (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) in reference to the above captioned investigation at NCISRA Djibouti on CLDJ. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) provided a sworn statement. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated on 24MAY13 at approximately 0025, he reported to his usual duty as the Air Traffic Liaison Officer operating in the Air Traffic Control tower at the DAIA. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised he was working with a Djiboutian Air Traffic Controller named (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and a United States Civilian Contractor, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) CIV. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) reported (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) started acting erratic for no apparent reason, and threatened him with a metal pipe. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) later said "Don't let me catch you in Djibouti City" followed by (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) making a hand gesture across his throat as if slitting a throat. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he asked (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) if he was threatening to kill him and (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) responded by saying "yes." (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is willing to cooperate with local Djiboutian authorities regarding an investigation and prosecution. Exhibit (1) pertains.

4. On 24MAY13 RA interviewed (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) at NCISRA Djibouti on CLDJ. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) reported that on 24MAY13 at 0025, he witnessed a threat made by (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) towards (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) "snapped" for an unknown reason. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) described (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) slamming and throwing objects before leaving the tower and returning with a three foot long piece of

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CONTROL: 24MAY13 -MEDJ-0058-7CNA/C

29MAY13

metal. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) reported (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) made swinging gestures with the metal towards (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said did not see or hear any abnormal comments made to (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) prior to (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) becoming upset. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised he heard (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) say "if I catch you in Djibouti City" while at the same time (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) made a hand gesture across his throat. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) whether that comment was a threat, and (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) responded by saying "yes." Exhibit (2) pertains.

5. On 24MAY13, a DD2701 (Initial Information for Victims and Witnesses of Crime) was provided to (b)(6), (b)(7)(C).

6. On 29MAY13, CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USN, provided a copy of an electronic mail he received from (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), Director of DAIA. The electronic mail contained a translated version of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) statement concerning the above captioned investigation. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) statement indicated he and (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had a dispute over operating runway lights when (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) pulled a pocket knife. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) statement provided that he made a decision to defend himself, but did not state what he did to defend himself. Exhibit (3) pertains.

7. On 29MAY13, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) CIV, provided NCIS with a copy of a photograph of the alleged metal pipe used by (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) against (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). The photograph was taken by (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), CIV on 24MAY13. Exhibit (4) pertains.

8. On 24MAY13 and 29MAY, CAPT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USN, Commanding Officer, CLDJ, was briefed on the above captioned investigation.

9. Due to the fact that NCIS has no jurisdiction regarding the offense, no other investigative activity will be conducted.

DISCLOSURE ACCOUNTING

10. A copy of this report, along with all exhibits, will be provided to the Gendarmerie for investigative purposes.

PARTICIPANTS

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT, DJIBOUTI - NCISRU

DISTRIBUTION

NCISHQ:023B

INFO :MEFO/Command (LT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USN, Camp Lemonnier
SJA)/Gendarmerie/002A

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PAGE 2 LAST (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) LNN

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (INFO)

26SEP13

SPECIAL INQUIRY (II)

CONTROL: 26SEP13-MEDJ-0104-7XCR

I/DJIBOUTIAN NATIONALS CONDUCT PEACEFUL GATHERING OUTSIDE OF CHABELLEY
AIRFIELD ENTRY CONTROL POINT

COMMAND/CAMP LEMONNIER/20700

MADE AT/CNGL/RESIDENT AGENCY GREAT LAKES (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT

NARRATIVE

1. On 25Sep13, NCISRA Djibouti was advised of local national Djiboutians gathering outside the entrance gate of the Chabelley Airfield in Djibouti. According to preliminary information provided by SSgt (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF, of the Camp Lemonnier Base Defense Operations Center, approximately seven to nine personnel gathered approximately 30 meters northeast of the Chabelley entry control point (ECP) at about 0850 hours on 25Sep13. Civil affairs personnel from Chabelley Airfield approached the group of Djiboutians who subsequently inquired about jobs on the installation and proclaimed they would remain at the location until given employment. The gathering was reportedly peaceful and did not occur on the military installation itself.

2. At about 1110 hours on 25Sep13, civil affairs personnel again approached the individuals gathered outside of Chabelley's ECP, after the group of individuals were observed constructing a makeshift rock wall to block the wind. The individuals stated they were going to remain at the location until they caught the attention of the Djiboutian government. NCISRA Djibouti was notified of the incident shortly thereafter.

3. At about 1500 hours, NCIS agents made contact with members of the Djiboutian National Police (DNP) Special Brigade Unit in Babala District. DNP officers were briefed on the gathering and asked to assist in speaking with the individuals involved. DNP, accompanied by NCIS agents, responded to the Chabelley Airfield ECP and spoke with the attending guards. The airmen on duty stated the Djiboutians had left approximately two hours prior, at about 1330 hours, and had been peaceful throughout their stay. The airmen also pointed out the location in which the gatherers congregated. There was a small amount of trash at the spot but not a recognizable brick wall reportedly constructed by the group.

4. DNP then proceeded to an area down the road in which a group of Djiboutians had congregated under a shade tree near a running stream. DNP confirmed the group of men under the tree, approximately 300 meters from the Chabelley Airfield ECP, were the same individuals who had gathered and asked for employment at Chabelley Airfield. According to members of the group, their intentions are peaceful and they are not a threat to US Forces. They stated their intention was to petition in order to gain employment, as others before them had reportedly done. DNP advised the group that they

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CONTROL:26SEP13-MEDJ-0104-7XCR

26SEP13

should not congregate near the gate as it causes US Forces to become concerned. The group agreed they would not return but still wanted to gain employment at Chabelley Airfield.

5. The members of the group were reportedly frustrated, stating that they are from the local, surrounding villages and should be given first consideration for employment at a local installation. Moreover, Djiboutians observe vehicles bussing personnel onto the base, but the personnel are not necessarily Djiboutians, but instead, third country nationals. The group believed many Djiboutians are capable of completing the same type of job and should be considered for the positions over other foreigners.

6. Through a translator, the gatherers were advised there is a proper procedure to seek employment and it should be requested through Camp Lemonnier, not Chabelley Airfield. DNP ended by reiterating the group should not remain outside the gate, and the gatherers agreed. Lastly, DNP stated Djiboutians are supposed to have protest permits if they wish to do so. The incident concluded at about 1600 hours with the DNP transporting the individuals to their village.

PARTICIPANTS

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT, DJIBOUTI - NCISRU
AL AGENT, DJIBOUTI - NCISRU
ECIAL AGENT, DJIBOUTI - NCISRU

DISTRIBUTION

NCISHQ:0023

INFO :002A/MEFO/MEDJ/449th Air Expeditionary Group, Air
Component Coordination Element (H)

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (CLOSED ONLY)

28FEB14

SPECIAL INQUIRY (II)

CONTROL: 27FEB14-EUGG-0091-7XNA/C

I/HIJACKING OF LIBERIAN FLAGGED VESSEL MERCHANT TANKER KERALA

COMMAND/DOD INTEREST/00000

MADE AT/EUGG/FORCE PROTECTION DETACHMENT GHANA (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) ,
SUPERVISORY SPECIAL AGENT

EXHIBIT(S)

- (1) IA: RESULTS OF INTERVIEWS WITH CREWMEMBERS OF THE MERCHANT TANKER KERALA/28FEB14
- (2) IA: RESULTS OF CRIME SCENE EXAMINATION/28FEB14

NARRATIVE

1. This limited scope investigation was initiated pursuant to suspected violations of Article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Piracy), 18 United States Code Section 1651 (Piracy) international law regarding piracy, including activities described in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982.
2. On 18Jan14, the Liberian Flagged vessel, Merchant Tanker (M/T) KERALA, was hijacked while conducting ship-to-ship (STS) operations in the anchorage zone of the Port of Luanda, Angola. Once hijacked, the vessel and its crew were held captive for a period of eight days by a total of 16 pirates. The MT KERALA was subsequently released on 25Jan14, and directed to proceed to the commercial port of Tema, Ghana to allow for the crew to undergo medical attention and execute a crew change.
3. On 29Jan14, Reporting Agent (RA) conducted an interview of the entire crew of the MT KERALA. However, due to the sporadic level of detail gathered by the crew during the debriefs, the collective information was gathered and put into a concise and chronological report. Exhibit (1) provides further detail.
4. On 29Jan14, a crime scene examination of the M/T KERALA was conducted by the Ghana Police Service (GPS) representatives. Per jurisdiction regulations, evidence was seized by the GPS representatives. Photographs and additional information are included in Exhibit (2).
5. This investigation is hereby closed.

ACTION

0023: Report ONLY

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

CONTROL:27FEB14-EUGG-0091-7XNA/C

28FEB14

DISTRIBUTION

NCISHQ:023B (M)

ACTION:0023

INFO :US EMBASSY ABUJA, NIGERIA/EUNA (E)/US EMBASSY LUANDA,
ANGOLA/US EMBASSY MONROVIA, LIBERIA/EURT (E)/INTERPOL, LYON,
FRANCE

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (INFO)

27MAR14

SPECIAL INQUIRY (II)

CONTROL: 27MAR14-MEKE-0002-7XCR

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

COMMAND/NON DOD/00000

MADE AT/MEKE/FORCE PROTECTION DETACHMENT KENYA (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT

EXHIBIT(S)

(1) Email From (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) 24Mar14...(Copy All)

NARRATIVE

1. On 24Mar14, US Embassy Nairobi received an email from (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) alleging Mr. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is threatening (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) in Garissa, Kenya. Exhibit (1) pertains.

2. On 25Mar14, the originator of the complaint provided a copy of the (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) passport to the US Embassy in which he was located in the Department of State database. The Regional Security Office, US Embassy Nairobi, Kenya stated they have no jurisdiction concerning this matter and advised the Kenyan police would be better suited to address this issue locally.

NAME:

AKA:

AKA:

DOB:

POB:

SSN:

TN DL:

SPOUSE

compla

DOB:

POB:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

ly name as person who reported the

3. According to DoD database checks, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) served in the US Army Reserves from 11Mar88 thru 21Mar90. He then served US Army National Guard from 22Mar90 thru 05Sep90. He finally served in the US Army Reserves from 06Sep90 thru 13Aug91. His discharge is uncharacterized. This report is being forwarded to US Army Criminal Investigations Command, 5th Military Police Battalion (CID), HHD, 5th MP Bn (CID), 5th MP Bn (CID), Unit 23119, APO AE 09054-3119 for action deemed appropriate.

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

CONTROL: 27MAR14-MEKE-0002-7XCR

27MAR14

PARTICIPANTS

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY, US Embassy Nairobi

DISTRIBUTION

INFO : 5th Military Police Battalion (CID) (HHD, 5th MP Bn
(CID) 5th MP Bn (CID) Unit 23119APO AE 09054-3119) (M)/MEBJ (E) /
MEDJ (E)

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (CLOSED)

16APR13

SEXUAL ASSAULT - ADULT (II)

CONTROL: 28MAR13-MEDJ-0039-8SNA/C

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

COMMAND/449TH EXPEDITIONARY AIR GROUP/FHXK4

MADE AT/MEDJ/DJIBOUTI - NCISRU (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT

REFERENCE(S)

(A) NCISRA ROI (INTERIM) (CONTAINS EXHIBITS 1-11)/01APR13

EXHIBIT(S)

(12) IA: RESULTS OF INQUIRY INTO OFF CAMP ACTIVITY/02APR13

(13) IA: RECEIPT OF DOCUMENTATION/02APR13

(14) IA: RESULTS OF RE-INTERVIEW OF (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) APR13

(15) IA: RESULTS OF RE-INTERVIEW OF (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) 0APR13

(16) IA: RESULTS OF RE-INTERVIEW OF (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) R13

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. This reactive investigation was initiated by NCISRA Djibouti upon the notification from 449th Air Expeditionary Group (449 AEG), Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) of an unrestricted report of unwanted sexual contact made by (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SrA USAF (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), 726th Expeditionary Air Base Squadron (EABS). On 27MAR13, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was interviewed and provided a sworn statement alleging her shift supervisor, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SSGT USAF (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) 726 EABS, unzipped and opened her uniform blouse, placed his hands on her knees and separated her legs. This alleged assault occurred on or about 10MAR13 while (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was working a fixed patrol aboard Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ) flightline. Scene examination of the guard post revealed no items of evidentiary value. Command interviews of 726 EABS personnel surfaced allegations of a history of sexually inappropriate comments and behavior relative to (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and the identification of two additional alleged victims: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SrA USAF (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SrA USAF (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was interrogated by NCIS, whereupon he denied all culpability prior to an invocation of his right to counsel. Buccal swabs obtained from (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) were forwarded to US Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory (USACIL) for entry into the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) database. Reference (A) details investigative efforts. Database inquiries and USAF records reference (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) revealed previous impositions of judicial and

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administrative actions relative various infractions. Investigative efforts relative (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) off-camp activities and claims of killing people did not yield investigative leads.

2. The determination was made that prosecutorial jurisdiction rests with the Third Air Force (3 AF), Ramstein Air Base (AB), Germany. Subsequent to this determination, Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) Detachment 518, Spangdahlem AB, Germany opened an investigation, 518-C-120-M1-04306131050622 into this matter. All investigative action is complete and this investigation is closed as referred to AFOSI. A complete copy of this investigation, to include original statements, is being provided to Special Agent (SA) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) AFOSI Det 518. AFOSI will report case disposition. Investigation closed.

NARRATIVE

1. This reactive investigation was initiated pursuant to suspected violations of Article 120 (Abusive Sexual Contact), Article 92 (Sexual Harassment) and Article 134 (Indecent Language) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

2. Subsequent to the submission of Reference (A), during 30MAR13-01APR13, RA conducted inquiries into the off-camp activities of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and the victims identified in the above captioned investigation. Results of inquiry revealed no evidence (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) left CLDJ with any of the victims in the investigation. Exhibit (12) pertains.

3. On 01APR13, command furnished NCISRA Djibouti with a copy of the electronic consolidated military record for (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and a recent Security Forces work schedule. Also received were the results of a query into the Automated Military Justice Analysis & Management System (AMJAMS) relative (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) AMJAMS query indicated a history of administrative actions. Exhibit (13) pertains.

4. During 08-13APR13, RA re-interviewed the victims in this investigation in an effort to further clarify information (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) provided in her sworn statement, Exhibit (6) of Reference (A), relative (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) claims of killing people while in and out of the military. Subsequent follow-up interviews indicated that prior to the 10MAR13 reported assault of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had made such claims to (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) during a post check at Guard Post 3-1. Specifically, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) claims he killed people while deployed to Iraq and that he was somehow involved in a homicide which is currently under investigation in the United States (NFI). Available database inquiries failed to corroborate aforementioned claims. Exhibits (14)-(16) provide amplifying details.

5. On 15APR13, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was redeployed to his parent command aboard Spangdahlem AB, Germany. It was further determined prosecutorial jurisdiction rests with the Third Air Force (3 AF), Ramstein Air Base (AB), Germany. Upon this determination, AFOSI Detachment 518, Spangdahlem AB, Germany opened case number 518-C-120-M1-04306131050622.

6. All investigative action is complete and this investigation is closed as

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referred to AFOSI. A complete copy of this investigation is being provided to SA (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) AFOSI Det 518, via US Registered Mail RE 216 275 635 US. Investigation is closed.

DISCLOSURE ACCOUNTING

This report will be provided to AFOSI, Detachment 518, Unit 3745, APO AE 09126 (ATTN: SA (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) , for law enforcement purposes.

ACTION

23C2: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) fingerprint cards (FD 249) are being submitted to NCISHQ Code 23C2 via Registered Mail number Re 216 275 620 US.

DISTRIBUTION

NCISHQ:023B (E)

ACTION:23C2 (E)

INFO :AFOSI (SA (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)) (M) /MEFO (E)

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (CLOSED)

18APR14

SEXUAL EXPLOITATION - CHILD (II)

CONTROL: 29DEC13-MEDJ-0135-8ENA/C

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

COMMAND/COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE HORN OF AFRICA/20700

MADE AT/MEDJ/DJIBOUTI - NCISRU/

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT

REFERENCE(S)

- (A) NCISRA DJIBOUTI, AFRICA ROI (INTERIM)/12JAN14 (Contains Exhibits 1-11)/12JAN14
- (B) NCISRA DJIBOUTI, AFRICA ROI (INTERIM)/05MAR14 (Contains Exhibits 12-14)/05MAR14

EXHIBIT(S)

- (15) IA: RECEIPT OF DCFL LABORATORY REPORT/26MAR14
- (16) IA: RESULTS OF REVIEW OF ELECTRONIC MEDIA/14APR14

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. On 29Dec13, NCIS received notification from Investigator MA2 (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USN, Criminal Investigation Division (CID), Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, Africa, that Army Specialist (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was suspected of having child pornography on his personnel computer. Army Specialist (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USA, reported on 27Dec13, he observed (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) viewing a suspected video containing child pornography while in their Container Living Unit (CLU) located at Building #H222. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) related he observed what he thought was a video of a fifteen year old nude white female standing next to an adult white male who was fully clothed. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he did not see any sexual contact between the white male and the suspect fifteen year old. On 29Dec13, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was interrogated and denied having child pornography in his possession. On 29Dec13, a crime scene examination was conducted of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) CLU and several items of electronic media was seized. Additional witness interviews were conducted, and (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) personnel file was reviewed. Electronic media was reviewed resulted in finding no child pornography. Command was briefed on the status of the investigation and due to insufficient evidence, determined no further judicial or administrative action would be pursued.

NARRATIVE

- 1. This reactive investigation pertains to suspected violations of Article 134 (Possession of Child Pornography) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
- 2. On 25MAR14, Reporting Agent (RA) received the previously submitted electronic media from the Defense Cyber Crime Center (DCFL) and a working copy hard drive, a Forensic Laboratory Report, and the Digital Forensic Technician Notes. The forensic report revealed a total of 2,667,647 image

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18APR14

files and 14,479 movie files were searched against the database of known child pornography images and files. As a result, no known child pornography was discovered (Exhibit 15).

3. From 25MAR14 through 12APR14, RA and Participating Agent (PA) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) conducted a manual search of the forensic copy of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) electronic media. The search revealed no images or movies contained suspected child pornography (Exhibit 16).

4. On 14Apr14, MAJ (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USA, Executive Officer (XO), 1-18 Infantry, and LTC (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USA, Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), Horn of Africa (HOA), was apprised of the status of this investigation and expressed the command's intention to not pursue any administrative/judicial action due to insufficient evidence.

PARTICIPANTS

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT, DJIBOUTI - NCISRU

DISTRIBUTION

NCISHQ:023B

INFO :1-18TH infantry battalion ((Commanding Officer))/MEFO/
002A

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Page 21 redacted for the following reason:

Page (21): - Referred to the Air Force Office of Special Investigations for review/return